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campaigns and “took their innovative ideas to other
state campaigns, the Congressional Union, the Na-
tional Women’s Party, and the final battle for the
federal woman suffrage amendment.”   33
From 1900-1920, the press coverage in the LAT and
NYT concerning the New Woman, suffragists and anti-
suffragists played a role in the perception of women
and what women could and should do during the
turbulent times of the early twentieth century.  More
importantly, the language used in each paper to
support or attack the New Woman was the same
language used to support or attack the suffragists. 
This in turn helped create environments in which
either suffragist or anti-suffragists thrived.  In Califor-
nia, the positive coverage of the New Woman and the
suffragist allowed suffragists to sustain a popular
movement that lasted well beyond the granting of
universal suffrage in 1911.  Conversely, in New York,
the negative coverage of the New Woman and the
suffragist allowed the anti-suffrage movement to gain
significant traction.  Not only did New York’s intense
anti-suffrage movement most likely delay the vote for
universal suffrage until 1917, but it also allowed for
the continuation of the anti movement, even after
universal suffrage was considered a federal right.  By
examining the newspapers’ coverage of the New
Woman, the suffragists, and the antis in light of the
universal suffrage movements within each state, one
can clearly observe a link between the press coverage
and the environment in which the movements strug-
gled or thrived.  And for historians seeking to under-
stand the development of the suffrage and anti-suf-
Suffragists, Antis, and the New Woman 87
frage movements in New York and California, such a
link is undoubtedly newsworthy.
Jacqueline Stotlar is a senior History and
Women’s & Gender Studies double major with a minor
in English.  This essay is an abbreviated version of her
senior thesis, which was awarded the Mehl Prize, an
annual award given to the best senior thesis in the
History Department.  Jacqueline enjoys playing the
double bass and trap and skeet shooting in her spare
time.  In the fall, she plans on pursuing a Master’s in
Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at The Ohio
State University.
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The horrific events that took place on 11 September
2001 are forever carved into the American psyche. An
estimated 3,000 lives were lost in the World Trade
Center alone. The list of casualties includes nearly
2,800 civilians. Perhaps the most appalling is the
staggering number of first responders – 343 firefighters
and sixty police officers – who were killed while at-
tempting to save civilian lives. Even more offensive are
the reasons why they died: faulty radios and improper
communication within, and between, the New York fire
and police departments.  These internal failures in the1
wake of external attacks compound the tragedy and
reveal the vital nature of effective and efficient commu-
nication, a factor too frequently underappreciated.
Communication failures in history confirm this assess-
ment. A case in point is the sinking of the U.S.S.
Indianapolis in 1945, known as the worst open-sea
disaster in U.S. Naval history, which took the lives of
nine hundred men. 
The attack took place fifteen minutes after midnight
on 30 July 1945, when the bow of the U.S. Naval
heavy-cruiser, Indianapolis, was struck by two Japa-
nese torpedoes. Just twelve minutes later the vessel,
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along with three hundred of its men, sank to the ocean
floor. The surviving sailors swam hurriedly from the
wreckage. Nearly nine hundred men went into the
water after the Indianapolis’ sinking; by the time help
arrived nearly four days later, only 316 survived.
Among those survivors was the ship’s captain, Charles
B. McVay III, who was later court-martialed by the
Navy and convicted of not taking the appropriate
measures to protect the ship – a charge clearly in-
tended to spare the Navy any further embarrassment
stemming from the tragedy.2
The survivors, meanwhile, were outraged by the
conviction of their captain, and accused the High
Command of using McVay as a scapegoat for the
disaster. Vital information was withheld from McVay
prior to the Indianapolis’ final voyage, which led to a
lessened state of alert.  Although McVay reported that3
distress calls were sent before the ship sank, the Navy
insisted that none were received. Information declassi-
fied in 1999 refutes the Navy’s claim.  Furthermore,4
when Indianapolis failed to arrive at its destination in
the Philippine islands on 31 July, no one at the base
reported the ship as missing. Following Captain
McVay’s posthumous exoneration by the US Congress
in October of 2000, blame still needs to be assigned for
the sinking of the Indianapolis; the role that communi-
cation failures played in the death of hundreds of
sailors needs to be carefully assessed.  
       Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Sinking of the2
U.S.S. Indianapolis and the Subsequent Court Martial of Rear
Adm. Charles B. McVay III, USN, 106  Cong., 1  sess., 1999, 29. th st
       Ibid., 30. 3
       Ibid., 39.4
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Following the court martial of Captain McVay, the
sinking of the Indianapolis slowly faded from the
minds of the American public. Steven Spielberg’s 1975
cinematic classic, Jaws, reintroduced the subject
when Captain Quint, a fictional survivor of the India-
napolis, retold the story of the sinking. Quint’s famous
monologue sparked a wave of new scholarship examin-
ing the causes of the disaster. The most complete
analysis of the onshore communication errors prior to
and immediately following the attack appears in Dan
Kurzman’s Fatal Voyage (1990). Kurzman explores the
communication breakdown between the major players
involved in the sinking and delayed rescue: the Chief
of Naval Operations in Washington (CNO), the Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC),
and Captain McVay.  Meanwhile, Doug Stanton’s In5
Harm’s Way (2001), discusses the onboard communi-
cation failures during the ship’s sinking.  This paper6
synthesizes all of the Navy’s miscommunications –
before, during, and after the sinking – that led to the
disaster, revealing the enormity of the communication
failures at all levels and phases of the event. While the
Navy’s official intelligence report in 1945 stated, “all of
the products of intelligence must be available to all
branches and all specialists,” this was not the case
with the Indianapolis.  A careful reexamination of the7
No Room for Error 91
evidence reveals that the avoidable tragedy was not
only the ship’s sinking, but also the delay in rescuing
its survivors; and was due to a complex web of factors,
including flaws in, and violations of, naval communi-
cation procedures during an unprecedented event. 
The Indianapolis played a crucial role in World War
II’s Pacific theater. The ship was commissioned in
1932 as a combat vessel used to bomb onshore, enemy
encampments. Equipped with a laundry-mat, butch-
ery, and even its own water plant, the Indianapolis
“was a floating city… [with] enough weaponry to lay
siege to downtown San Francisco.”  The ship was put8
under command of Captain McVay in 1944; becoming
the flagship of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet under Admiral
Raymond Spruance.  During the Battle of Iwo Jima,9
the Indianapolis served as the Command Ship and
took part in the bombing of the island. Following the
U.S. victory at Iwo Jima, the ship shot down seven
Kamikaze planes as part of the pre-invasion bombard-
ment of Okinawa before returning to the San Francisco
Bay for repairs. It was in San Francisco that the
Indianapolis was given a mission deemed vital to U.S.
victory in the war. Two heavily guarded crates were
secured onto the deck of the ship. Unbeknownst to the
crew, the crates contained weapons grade uranium-
235 core – the key component of a nuclear weapon –
and the “Little Boy” atomic bomb, which would be
dropped on Hiroshima.  The crew was intrigued by the10
mysterious crates, and its curiosity was intensified
when Captain McVay broadcast a message he had
       Stanton, 27.8
       Ibid.9
 Ibid., 36.10
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received just moments before setting sail: “Indianapolis
under orders of Commander in Chief and must not be
diverted from its mission for any reason.”  The India-11
napolis departed San Francisco Bay on 16 July 1945
and arrived in Tinian on 26 July, successfully deliver-
ing the bomb. 
Shortly thereafter, the Indianapolis was sent to the
Island of Guam to refuel before joining an invasion
fleet in Leyte, Philippines. The route it would take from
Guam to Leyte was known in the Navy as the Peddie
Convoy Route (PCR).  Traveling the PCR was always a12
challenge, for at times it was relatively safe, while at
other times extremely perilous. On 24 July 1945, as
the Indianapolis was en route to Tinian Island, a
destroyer-escort, U.S.S. Underhill, was sunk while
traveling along the PCR. The Underhill was brought
down by a Kaiten: a secret Japanese suicide torpedo.
Kaitens traveled in packs led by the largest, most
effective Japanese submarines, called Tamons. When
driven into a ship, the Kaitens detonated, causing
catastrophic damage. The Underhill was cut directly in
half upon impact.  13
Members of a top secret U.S. code-breaking project
known as ULTRA had been working tirelessly to break
Japanese codes concerning the Kaitens. After the
attack on the Underhill, ULTRA was able to officially
confirm the existence of the suicide crafts. Further-
more, ULTRA discovered the presence of Tamons near
the PCR. Worried that the Japanese would know their
No Room for Error 93
codes had been broken, ULTRA refused to wirelessly
transmit the position of Tamons, even if a ship was in
danger of attack.  The information involving Kaitens,14
Tamons, and the sinking of the Underhill was labeled
as ultra-secret and sent to CNO, where it would have
to trickle down the chain of command. 
The relaying of PCR information is the first break-
down in communication that led to the Indianapolis’
sinking. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief of
CNO and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the
Navy’s head honcho. His office in Washington was the
first to receive the report from ULTRA about the PCR
and the Underhill. Captain Samuel Anderson, who
worked as the Pacific Fleet Operations Officer for
Admiral King, read the report and was frightened by
what he saw. Immediately, he drafted a dispatch to
Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of
CINCPAC, advising him to change the Indianapolis’
route. Anderson’s superior, however, stopped the
dispatch before it was sent out and promised that a
higher authority – Admiral King – would handle the
issue.  15
Apparently, Captain Anderson was the only Navy
officer to make a forthright effort to relay the informa-
tion. The report was sent from the CNO office to
CINCPAC, where it reached combat intelligence officer,
Captain E.T. Layton. Layton sent the information to
Vice Admiral Charles McMorris and Commodore
James Carter, Admiral Nimitz’ chief of staff and assis-
tant chief of staff, respectively. No one appeared willing
to take responsibility for this ultra-secret intelligence
       Ibid.14
       Kurzman, 45.15
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report, as once again, the information was sent to
another department. This time Captain Oliver Naquin,
operations officer for a sub-division of CINCPAC called
the Marianas Command, was the recipient. Naquin,
paranoid and consumed with maintaining intelligence
integrity, locked the report in his office.  Naquin was16
so wrapped up in “[intelligence] security that he
seemed prepared to jeopardize the safety of a particu-
lar ship in order to maintain the integrity of the sys-
tem.”  17
Although vital information was withheld from him,
Captain McVay was briefed on the potential hazards
along the PCR on three separate occasions. First, he
was given a briefing by Lieutenant Joseph Waldron,
the routing officer for the port director. McVay, who
had no knowledge of the Underhill’s fate, inquired
about the safety of the PCR and even requested an
escort to Leyte. Waldron called Naquin’s office with the
request, and was told that no escort was needed.
Waldron, like McVay, was not informed of the sinking
of the Underhill; so he assured McVay that “there was
nothing out of the ordinary in the area.”  Next, McVay18
met with Commodore Carter. Carter, although fully
aware of the report, assumed that Lieutenant Waldron
would pass on such information, and did not mention
the issue to McVay. Finally, McVay had lunch with his
Fleet Commander, Admiral Spruance. Once again, the
life saving information was withheld from McVay.
There are only two explanations for Spruance’s failure
to alert his flagship’s captain to the dangers awaiting
No Room for Error 95
McVay on the PCR: CINCPAC did not give the informa-
tion to Spruance, or the Admiral felt the report was too
ultra-secret to divulge.  However, it is unlikely that a19
fleet commander would not be warned of a serious
threat to his flagship, especially when the information
had crossed the desk of his superior, Admiral Nimitz.
After three briefings, McVay still remained unaware of
the dangers that awaited him and his crew; and on 28
July 1945, he and the ill-fated Indianapolis set sail for
Leyte. 
McVay was well aware of the Navy decree, “Com-
manding Officers are at all times responsible for the
safe navigation of their ships,” and must, during times
of good visibility, “zigzag at discretion of the Com-
manding Officer.”  He spent all of 29 July 194520
zigzagging through the PCR. By eight o’clock pm,
visibility had become poor, and he ordered the ship to
stop zigzagging. Prior to retiring to his bunk at eleven
o’clock, McVay ordered his officers to “resume zigzag-
ging at their own discretion,” and “to wake him if there
were any weather changes.”  At 12:15 A.M. on 3021
July, two torpedoes from the Japanese submarine I-58
struck the Indianapolis. The first caused the most
structural damage to the ship, exploding its bow. More
ominously, the second destroyed the ship’s power
center, rendering the ship’s internal communications
useless. McVay immediately returned to the bridge and
ordered a distress signal be sent marking the ship’s
       Ibid., 45.19
       Raymond B. Lech, The Tragic Fate of the U.S.S.20
Indianapolis: The U.S. Navy’s Worst Disaster at Sea (New York:
Cooper Square Press, 2001), 211.
       Kenneth E. Ethridge, “The Agony of the Indianapolis,”21
American Heritage Magazine 33, no. 5 (August 1982): 1. 
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location, indicating that it had been hit by torpedoes,
and that immediate assistance was required. Since
communications were down, the Captain’s orders had
to be sent by runner. With no means of efficiently
communicating with the crew en masse, his orders
were unknown to most onboard. To make sure the
distress signal was sent, McVay ordered Commander
John Janney to the communications center. However,
radio shack one, which was used to send messages,
was completely wrecked.  Radio shack two, used to22
receive messages, remained functional after the second
hit. Herbert Miner, a technician in radio shack two,
worked with Communications Warrant Officer L.T.
Woods to quickly transform the receiver into a trans-
mitter. Miner watched as Woods furiously keyed out
the distress signal. According to Miner, “the antenna
needle jump[ed]… indicating that the message was in
fact being transmitted.”  Unaware if any distress23
signal had been sent, Captain McVay gave the order to
abandon ship. Minutes later, the Indianapolis sank,
stranding nine hundred soldiers in the middle of the
Pacific Ocean. 
The Indianapolis was scheduled to arrive in Leyte at
eleven o’clock on the morning of 31 July 1945.  As24
evening approached, Lieutenant Stuart Gibson, the
port director of the Harbor Entrance Control Post
(HECP) in Leyte, noticed the Indianapolis’ tardiness.
Gibson was not disturbed, for he fully expected the
ship to arrive in port, and, without recording an arrival
time, added it to the Ships Present list. CINCPAC
No Room for Error 97
protocol stated “arrivals not to be reported for combat-
ant ships.”  Furthermore, it was commonplace for a25
cruiser, particularly a flagship, to be redirected with-
out notice. This matter of the Indianapolis’ where-
abouts was better suited for the fleet commanders in
Leyte, but Gibson never relayed the message to his
superior officers. One of those commanders was
Captain Alfred Granum, operations officer of the
Frontier Command. Although the Indianapolis was in
his area of responsibility, Granum assumed that a
distress signal would have been sent in any case of
danger. Like Gibson, Granum figured a higher-ranking
official would handle the issue; once again, superior
officers were not contacted.  26
Adding to the tragic comedy of errors, the lack of
communication and knowledge of the Indianapolis’
whereabouts was present even among the highest-
ranking officers in Leyte. Rear Admiral L.D.
McCormick was also aware of the Indianapolis’ sched-
uled time of arrival, but did not know why the ship
was coming. McVay and the Indianapolis were being
sent to Admiral McCormick to receive training prior to
joining Vice Admiral Jesse Oldendorf’s Tokyo invasion
fleet. Oldendorf, on the other hand, knew why the ship
was being sent to McCormick, but was unaware of its
anticipated arrival time.  When asked why neither27
commander knew such vital information, Oldendorf
explained that the Okinawa communications center
was “notoriously inefficient in the forwarding of mes-
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sages.”   The communication problems within the port28
of Leyte, however, exacerbated the issue. Had one of
these three commanders taken the initiative to pin-
point the Indianapolis’ whereabouts, hundreds of lives
could have been saved. Unfortunately, nearly six
hundred soldiers died in the water due to a lack of
action and bureaucratic red tape that prevented
effective communication.
No one in the port of Leyte took responsibility for
the missing cruiser, but there remained the possibility
that the frantic distress signals sent out before it sank
would save the remaining stranded soldiers. Although
it was likely that the message was received in multiple
locations, it was equally likely that the recipients
believed the message to be a Japanese prank. There
are three documented recipients of the Indianapolis’
distress calls, all revealed by witnesses years after the
war. The first message was received, in a radio shack
on Leyte, by a young soldier on security duty, Clair
Young. Young stated that the message was “garbled,”
but still “identified the ship, its position, and its condi-
tion.”  After bringing the message to his superior29
officer, Young was told not to reply, however, “if
further messages are received, notify me immedi-
ately.”  The second message was received by another30
radio shack in Leyte. This time, the on-duty officer
responded immediately by ordering two fast, Navy tugs
to the received coordinates. Meanwhile, Commodore
Norman Gillette, in charge of naval operations on the
island, was playing bridge with some fellow officers.
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Upon hearing that tugs had been dispatched without
his knowledge, Gillette had them recalled. The tugs
were seven hours into the twenty-one hour trip.  The31
third, and final documented message was received by
a landing craft docked in Leyte harbor. The craft
received duplicate signals, eight minutes apart; it tried
to contact the Indianapolis, but could not get a re-
sponse. The craft sent the signals to the naval operat-
ing base in Leyte, but received no reply.  Ironically,32
just as three commanders withheld vital information
from Captain McVay prior to his voyage, the Indianapo-
lis’ distress calls were ignored by three different radio
shacks on the Island of Leyte, vividly illustrating the
potential for multiple failures in communications and
the need for duplication and confirmation.
The defense of a nation in wartime is as dangerous
as it is difficult, and proper communication is key to
the success of the Armed Forces. The tragedy of the
U.S.S. Indianapolis is clearly the result of improper
communication on every level. The Indianapolis was
uninformed of the imminent danger that loomed along
the PCR, and was unprepared for such an attack.
Furthermore, the ship’s line of communication was
broken during the attack. This prevented Captain
McVay from effectively relaying vital orders to his
engine room and radio shacks. Finally, confusion
regarding the Indianapolis’ whereabouts, due mostly to
a lack of initiative and faulty communication among
Navy officers in the Pacific, lead to the unnecessary
deaths of nearly nine hundred U.S. service members.
To protect the High Command from public embarrass-
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ment, McVay was forced to bear full responsibility for
the tragedy. McVay nobly endured a rare and highly
public court-martial, which permanently tarnished his
decorated record. Suffocating under the immense
weight of guilt, McVay took his own life on 6 November
1968. Today, the remaining survivors of the Indianapo-
lis uphold his honor. This dwindling group of extraor-
dinary soldiers recognizes the fault lies not with their
beloved captain; but rather with the Navy High Brass,
which, by the withholding of vital information, com-
pounded with systematic inefficiency, allowed the
worst open-sea disaster in U.S. Naval history.
This recognition of the vital nature of effective
communications comes with it valuable lessons that
can save lives if heeded, and cost them if ignored. A
second look at the 11 September 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center reveals avoidable errors largely
due to a lack of communication between police and fire
departments, and the use of sub par radios. Suicide
bombers, torpedoes, and other attacks may be beyond
all control, but creating and enforcing effective com-
munication is not. The breakdowns in New York first-
responder communication are eerily similar to those
that led to the sinking of the Indianapolis: lack of
efficient institutional communication and ignored
radio messages. Both events – the loss of 343 New
York firefighters and the deaths of nine hundred U.S.
soldiers – serve as a tragic testament of the importance
of flawless communication, including an established
and responsible chain of command; multiple channels,
checks, and confirmation; and state of the art equip-
ment suitable to the task, among the men and women
who defend those who cannot defend themselves. 
No Room for Error 101
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